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THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S
INTEGRAL ROLE IN THE FEDERAL
JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS:
EXCERPTED TESTIMONY OF ROBERTA
COOPER RAMO AND N. LEE COOPER
BEFORE THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF
THE UNITED STATES SENATE,
MAY 21, 1996t
ROBERTA COOPER RAMo* AND N. LEE COOPER*"
The mission of the American Bar Association (ABA), as stated
in its constitution, is to be the national representative of the legal
profession, serving the public and the profession by promoting jus-
tice, professional excellence and respect for law.' For the past 118
years, the Association has labored diligently to fulfill these ambi-
t Footnotes supplied by editors.
* J.D., University of Chicago. Ms. Ramo is the Immediate Past President of the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the first woman to head the organization in its 117-year history.
Named one of the Best Lawyers in America in corporate law, Ms. Ramo is currently a
partner with New Mexico's largest law firm-Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk.
** J.D., University of Alabama. Mr. Cooper is the current President of the American Bar
Association. He is a founding partner in the Birmingham, Alabama law firm of Maynard,
Cooper & Gale and is also a former chair of the American Bar Association's policy-making
body, the House of Delegates.
1 See ABA CONST. art. 1, § 1.2 (adopted Aug. 24, 1936; substantially revised effective
July 21, 1971; 1984; 1994).
The purposes of the Association are to uphold and defend the Constitution of the
United States and maintain representative government; to advance the science of ju-
risprudence; to promote throughout the nation the administration of justice and the
uniformity of legislation and of judicial decisions; to uphold the honor of the profession
of law; to apply the knowledge and experience of the profession to the promotion of the
public good; to encourage cordial intercourse among the members of the American bar;
and to correlate and promote the activities of the bar organizations in the nation
within these purposes and in the interests of the profession and of the public.
Id.; see also Annual Meeting in Chicago Caps 1983-84 Year, 70 OCT. A.B.A. J. 109, 109
(1984). Chief Justice Warren E. Burger stated that the ABA's "vision should be of an Amer-
ican Bar that will focus the influence, the power and the programs of this great body - the
largest association of lawyers in the world - upon the objectives that brought it into being
more than 100 years ago. These purposes were to improve justice and ensure an honorable
profession." Id.
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tious purposes.2 It has done so in a myriad of ways, including es-
tablishing high standards for legal education, developing model
codes of ethics for lawyers and judges, educating its members
about new developments in all areas of practice, educating the
public about the constitutional system of government and the rule
of law, bringing the expertise of lawyers to bear on matters of pub-
lic policy having significant constitutional and legal aspects, and
providing objective evaluations of the professional qualifications of
potential judges for the federal bench.3
It is ironic that the ABA, one of the very few associations in
Washington which does not have a political action committee,
does not make campaign contributions, does not endorse candi-
dates for public office and does not rate the performance of con-
gressional incumbents is often charged with being a partisan
political group. The ABA's members represent all aspects of the
legal community; they are from all political backgrounds and affil-
iations and they join out of a desire to improve their ability to rep-
resent their clients and to improve the system of laws which gov-
ern this country-nothing less and nothing more.4
2 See ABA CONST. art. 2, § 2.1 (1994) (stating that American Bar Association was
founded on August 21, 1878); see also R. Townsend Davis, Jr., Note, The American Bar
Association and Judicial Nominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 550, 560
(1989) (stating that ABA sought involvement in judicial nomination process since 1870s).
3 See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practi-
cal Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 91, 161-62 (1995)
(explaining that ABA is responsible for rules of conduct and responsibility that are sup-
posed to be followed, either in ABA's format or similar state derived set of rules, by every
attorney in United States); Jennifer Gordon, Symposium: Economic Justice in America's
Cities: Visions and Revisions of a Movement, We Make the Road By Walking: Immigrant
Workers, the Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 407, 434 (1995) (stating how ABA funds awaken society to violations of immigrant
workers' rights); Rhonda McMillion, Ringing Out the 103d: A Partisan Congress Closes
with Substantial List of Measures Passed, 81 JAN. A.B.A. J. 87, 87 (1995) (describing ABA-
supported legislation passed by 103d Congress); Lynn S. Muster, A Proposal for the Hire
and Tenure of Faculty of Color in Higher Education, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 45, 58 (1994)
(stating that ABA involves itself in education and criteria for education of those who plan
to and do attend law schools).
4 See ABA CONST. art. 3, § 3.1 (1994) (providing that "[alny person of good moral charac-
ter in good standing at the bar of a state, territory or possession of the United States is
eligible to be a member of the Association.. ."); see also Saundra Torry, In Speech, Dole Re-
ignites Feud Over Bar Association, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1996, at A10 (quoting ABA Presi-
dent Ramo, stating that ABA membership is representative of profession, as "24 percent of
its 370,000 members are women and 11 percent are minorities[, and t]he ABA 'is mainly
white and mainly male'"); What the Members Think: Expectations and Priorities Solicited
Through an In-Depth Survey of the ABA Membership, 78 Nov. A.B.A. J. 60, 60 (1992) (pro-
viding analysis of ABA membership, showing its diversity).
ABA'S INTEGRAL ROLE
In 1936, the ABA adopted its current constitutional frame-
work.5 One of the key elements of that structure was the creation
of a broadly representative policy-making body, the House of Dele-
gates.6 The House of Delegates is now roughly the size of the
United States Congress. Members of the House of Delegates rep-
resent all segments of the legal profession and are chosen by state
and local bar associations around the country, specialty sections of
the ABA, other national legal organizations, and by ABA members
in each state.7 Like the U.S. Senate, the ABA House of Delegates
acts on dozens of recommendations brought to it each year by its
members, either on their own motion or, far more typically, as rep-
resentatives of another bar association or an ABA section or
committee.'
The ABA's policy adoptions deal with internal governance, stan-
dards for accrediting schools, ethical standards for lawyers, rec-
ommendations for improvements in judicial administration, and
recommendations for enhancements in areas of substantive law of
concern to the Association's members, whether it be antitrust, tax,
tort liability, intellectual property, family, criminal, administra-
tive procedure, civil rights, or other areas of the law. Most of the
policy adoptions concern relatively technical issues, important in
their own right, but not of broad public interest. Other issues
strike sensitive chords both within and without the Association,
just as they do in Congress or among the general public. The Asso-
ciation has adopted more than 1,300 policy resolutions on matters
of public policy. There are few, if any, policy positions on which all
of the 340,000 members would agree, and many on which there
are significant disagreements within the ABA's House and among
its members.
The point is that the ABA has always been the home for a com-
plete range of views on almost every topic imaginable. Further-
5 The American Bar Association Constitution was adopted August 24, 1936, and it was
substantially revised effective July 21, 1971.
6 See ABA CONST. art. 6, § 6.1 (1994) (granting House of Delegates authority to "formu-
late policy" on behalf of ABA); see also Don Sarvey, A Hundred Years' Journey, 17 AUG. PA.
LAw. 4, 11 (1995) (claiming that Pennsylvania Bar Association modeled its House of Dele-
gates after that of ABA due to ABA's "strict principle of representation").
7 See ABA CONST. art. 6, §§ 6.3-6.10, 6.13 (1994) (describing how House of Delegates
members are elected).
8 See ABA CONST. art. 43, § 43.1 (1994) (explaining that at every meeting House must
act on recommendations properly submitted by state or local bar associations, affiliated
organizations or sections, or members).
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more, the House of Delegates is the elected body within the ABA
that controls and administers the operations of the Association.9
It should be noted that the House of Delegates is the policy-mak-
ing body of the Association, but its public policy votes are in no
way binding on individual members of the Association; they only
reflect the views of a majority of the members of the House. 10
The House's adoption of positions on federal legislation and fed-
eral government policy has existed since the House's inception."
In the late 1930s, the Association was vocal in opposing President
Roosevelt's "court-packing" plans.' 2 Today, the Association still
does not shy from adopting positions on issues which have sub-
stantial legal aspects and to which the expertise of the Bar may be
appropriately applied. People, including members of the Associa-
tion, may disagree with the ABA's conclusions and reject its coun-
sel. They may also question why the Association adopts policies
on some issues. All positions taken, however, are in furtherance
of the Association's mission.
The Association takes particular pride in one aspect of its efforts
to improve the justice system: its advisory role with respect to the
evaluation of federal judges.' 3 In 1952, following the election of
General Dwight D. Eisenhower, his Attorney General, the late
9 See ABA CONST. art. 6, § 6.1 (1994) (providing House of Delegates with its powers).
10 See What's Happening in the ABA, 1996 Apr. HAw. B.J. 32, 32 (1996) (explaining that
ABA "House of Delegates establishes policy for the ABA and takes positions on professional
and public issues"); see also Vicki S. Porter, Agenda for the ABA House of Delegates at the
1995 Midyear Meeting, 24 CoLo. LAw. 19, 19 (1995) (stating that House of Delegates "con-
trols, formulates policy for and administers the ABA").
11 See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. &
POL'Y REv. 193, 203 n.62 (1996) (explaining that House of Delegates was established in
1936 to attain uniform policy throughout legal society, similar to that of field of medicine);
see also ABA CONST. art. 6, § 6.1 (1994) (granting House of Delegates with its powers to
establish policy).
12 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Symposium, A Delegation Theory of the ABA, 10 ADMIN. L.J.
Am. U. 89, 97-98 (1996) (stating that President Roosevelt vetoed ABA-supported Walter-
Logan Bill as response to ABA's opposition to court-packing plan); see also Edward A. Ad-
ams, Inside the ABA: Procedural Weapons in Abortion Battle Membership-Wide Referen-
dum at Issue, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 7 (stating that there has not been "ABA-wide refer-
endum since the 1930s, when votes were conducted on child labor laws and President
Roosevelt's court packing plan").
13 See JOEL B. GROSSMAN, LAWYERS AND JUDGES 60-61 (1960) (discussing reasons for es-
tablishment of Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary); see also Public Citizen v. United
States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989) (stating that ABA Standing Committee on
Federal Judiciary supplies Department of Justice with advice concerning potential nomi-
nees for federal judiciary); Glenn R. Winters, The Judicial Nominating Committee, in SE-
LECTED READINGS: JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE 126, 126 (Glenn R. Winters ed., 1967)
(stating that ABA, in 1937, claimed that "the most acceptable substitute for direct election
of judges" is by having one committee investigate all credentials and abilities of potential
judges).
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Herbert Brownell, 4 and his Deputy Attorney General, William P.
Rogers,15 concluded that the Administration needed to have an in-
dependent review body to examine the qualifications of potential
nominees to the federal bench. 6 This independent review body
was established to assist the Administration in resisting pres-
sures to repay political debts by appointing persons who were not
of sufficient caliber to be exercising the important responsibilities
of the judiciary.1 7 Brownell and Rogers concluded that the nonpar-
tisan, national professional organization of lawyers, indeed the
only comprehensive "umbrella" lawyers' organization, the ABA,
was precisely the group to carry out this mission."8 Ever since, the
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary ("Standing Committee"
14 See Bart Barnes, Obituaries, Herbert Brownell Dies at 92; Eisenhower Attorney Gen-
eral, WASH. POST, May 3, 1997, at C6 (stating that Brownell, former U.S. Attorney General,
top White House adviser to Eisenhower, principal author of 25th Amendment to U.S. Con-
stitution, and GOP Chairman from 1944 through 1946, died of cancer on May 1, 1996).
15 See David Lauter, Ike Still Casts Long Shadow Over the Continent Geopolitics: His
Legacy Shapes Both the Issues and the Options for Those Trying to Redraw the Map of
Europe, L.A. TimEs, May 8, 1990, at A8 (stating that Rogers was Deputy Attorney General
and top political aide for President Eisenhower, then Secretary of State in President Rich-
ard M. Nixon's administration).
16 See John A. Sutro, Merits of the Merit Plan for Judicial Selection, in SELECTED READ-
INGS supra note 13, at 154, 156 (quoting Herbert Brownell's observation that "all too often a
judge gets his job as a reward for political loyalty and looks on the courthouse as 'a cozy rest
home'"). But see Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Diluting Justice on Appeal? An
Examination of the Use of District Court Judges Sitting by Designation on the United States
Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 351, 385 (1995) (finding that Eisenhower's ap-
pointments to federal bench were predominantly from his political party). See, e.g., Herbert
Brownell, Civil Rights in the 1950s, 69 TuL. L. REv. 781, 788-89 (1995) (stating that Eisen-
hower recognized "importance of appointing federal judges who would uphold the
Constitution").
17 See Justice Stevens Backs ABA's Screening Role, SAN DIEGO UNION & TRIB., Aug. 4,
1996, at A13. "President Eisenhower began the process as a way of resisting pressure to
use the bench for patronage appointments." Id.; see also EvAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND
TENURE OF JUDGES 22 (1944). Haynes notes that within the Senate and the Presidency, the
appointment of federal judges is extremely politicized. Id. The fact that senators do not
have to reveal their reasons for disapproval contributes to the selection process remaining
political. Id. President Hoover and Attorney General Mitchell made attempts to rid the
judicial selection process of its politics. Id. at n.8 (citing Kenneth Sears, The Appointment of
Federal District Court Judges, 25 ILL. L. REV. 54 (1930)); David A. Price, Rating Those Who
Rate Judges: Is Bar Association a 'Liberal Advocacy Group'?, INV. Bus. DAILY, June 17,
1996, at Al. Since 1952, the ABA has offered assistance in rating potential federal judicial
nominees based on their "integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament."
Id.; ABA Informal Dec. C-744, Campaigning for Judgeship, Mar. 12, 1964. "Canon for Pro-
fessional Ethics 2 in part provides: It is the duty of the Bar to endeavor to prevent political
considerations from outweighing judicial fitness in the selections of Judges." Id.
18 See GROSsmAN, supra note 13, at 71 (stating that Brownell, after initial doubts, de-
cided that ABA's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary was proper group to conduct
independent reviews of potential judicial nominees); see also HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL
JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 121 (1972) (acknowledging fact that ABA House of Dele-
gates established "Special Committee on the Judiciary"); Stephen J. Wermiel, The Nomina-
tion of Justice Brennan: Eisenhower's Mistake? A Look at the Historical Record, 11 CONST.
CoMMENTr. 515, 522-28 (1995) (justifying President Eisenhower's decision to nominate Wil-
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or "Committee") has been doing so for Republican and Democratic
administrations alike.
19
I. COMMITTEE STRUCTURE
The ABA's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary consists of
fifteen members: an at-large member who serves as Chair, two
members from the Ninth Circuit, and one member from each of
the other twelve federal circuits.20 The members are appointed for
staggered three year terms by the President of the ABA. 2
Although members may be re-appointed, no member serves more
than two terms, therefore one-third of the Committee changes
every year.22
It is stressed that the Committee members are not selected on
the basis of their politics; they are selected on the basis of their
professional reputations and their commitment to an enormous
investment of time and energy.23 Additionally, as conditions to ap-
pointment, each member agrees not to seek or accept federal judi-
cial appointment while on the Committee as well as for at least
one year thereafter, each member agrees to do all of his or her
liam Brennan, Jr. to Supreme Court since more than just politics were used to arrive at
decision).
19 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989) (stating
that Presidents, since 1952, have sought advice from ABA Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary concerning potential federal judicial nominees); see also Judicial Vacancies. The
Processing of Judicial Candidates: Why It Takes So Long and How It Could Be Shortened,
128 F.R.D. 143, 147 (1989) [hereinafter Judicial Vacancies] (noting that ABA's Standing
Committee on Federal Judiciary has been consulted on almost every federal judicial ap-
pointment since 1952); Davis, supra note 2, at 561 (stating that ABA Standing Committee
was created in 1946 and has advised every administration since Eisenhower).
20 See AMERicAN BAR ASsOCIATION, THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY: WHAT IT IS AND How IT Woms 1 (1991) [hereinafter WHAT IT IS] (explaining structure
of Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary); ABA CONST. art. 31, § 31.7 (1994) (describing
structure of Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary).
21 See GRossMAN, supra note 13, at 84 (explaining selection process for Standing Com-
mittee members); WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that Committee members are
appointed to staggered three year terms by ABA president); Joan M. Hall, Symposium,
Confirmation Controversy: The Selection of a Supreme Court Justice, The Role of the ABA
Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 980, 980 (1990) (stating
that Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary consists of fifteen members who are ap-
pointed by ABA President, at staggered three-year terms).
22 See William G. Ross, Participation By the Public in the Federal Judicial Selection Pro-
cess, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1, 36 n.162 (1990) (stating that Committee members may serve
maximum of two terms and that all three year terms are staggered); WHAT IT Is, supra note
20, at 1 (instructing that Committee members may only serve maximum of two terms).
23 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443-44 (stating that Committee members are selected
by ABA president); GROssmAN, supra note 13, at 84 (stating that Committee members are
appointed by ABA president); WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 1 (noting fact that ABA presi-
dent is granted authority to appoint members of Standing Committee).
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Committee work personally, and all Committee members are
mandated to refrain from partisan political activity on the federal
level.24 Furthermore, the President must select members who will
evaluate only the professional qualifications of candidates, and
will not consider ideology or philosophy.25
Appointments to the Committee are based on only one criteria:
Excellence. The ABA President seeks out members with out-
standing reputations for competence and integrity and who enjoy
the utmost confidence and respect in their communities. The cur-
rent Committee essentially reflects the diversity of the profession.
It is comprised of members with outstanding legal credentials.
Many of the Committee members have distinguished service in
federal and state governments and an assortment of legal organi-
zations, including state and local bar associations, and they also
have broad experience throughout the legal community. All of the
Committee members are practicing attorneys who bring to the
Committee's deliberations a broad knowledge of the bench and
bar. They have been prosecutors, law professors, public interest
lawyers, government service attorneys, legislators, judges, and
law clerks. They practice corporate law, real estate law, environ-
mental law, utilities and business law, medical and health law,
banking and securities law, trusts and estates, employment law,
civil and constitutional law, international and trade law, tort and
insurance law, and general litigation. The Committee members
are drawn from firms of varying sizes, including solo practitioners.
The one aspect of the Committee members' background which re-
mains unknown is their political affiliation. The ABA never asks.
Doubtless, all have been involved in political activities on some
level, but once on the Committee, they are forced to leave their
politics at the door.2 6
24 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining ABA's strict requirements to help
insure integrity and independence of Committee).
25 See GRossmAN, supra note 13, at 107 (explaining that Committee evaluates candi-
dates by their 'professional qualifications" and not their party affiliation); WHAT IT Is,
supra note 20, at 1 (stating that "Committee does not consider a prospective nominee's
philosophy or ideology"); see also Ross, supra note 22, at 36 (stating that political and ideo-
logical philosophies were investigated when candidates had "extreme views on such mat-
ters [that] might bear upon judicial temperament or integrity" but that such policy ceased
in 1990).
26 See WHAT IT IS, supra note 20, at 2 (explaining ABA's strict requirements to help
insure integrity and independence of Committee).
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It is important to note that, uniquely among Association enti-
ties, the Standing Committee is the final word on its evalua-
tions.27 Neither the Board of Governors, the House of Delegates,
nor the officers of the Association play any role in the judgments
rendered by the Standing Committee, and they also do not learn of
the Committee's recommendations until the recommendations are
released to the public.
The ABA Committee takes very seriously its responsibility for
providing an impartial evaluation of a candidate's professional
competence, judicial temperament and integrity. The Commit-
tee's practices and procedures are structured to achieve this goal,
and they do not permit consideration of philosophy or political ide-
ology in any evaluation. Over the last four decades every presi-
dent, Republican and Democrat alike, has made regular use of the
ABA Committee to evaluate the professional qualifications of
nominees and to advise the Attorney General of their
qualifications.28
A review of the Committee's evaluations of the judicial nomina-
tions sent to the Senate by the last eight presidents demonstrates
that few candidates have encountered serious opposition within
the Committee. Since 1980, the ABA has rated 1,608 nominees,
including all Supreme Court candidates, either "Qualified" or
"Well Qualified." Of the twenty-six nominees the Committee
found "Not Qualified," twenty-three were Democratic nominees
and three were Republican. 29 Despite sporadic, and sometimes in-
tense, criticisms that the Committee is either too conservative or
too liberal, it is still the most consistent evaluator of professional
credentials involved in the judicial evaluation process. In fact, it
27 See ABA CONST. art. 31, § 31.7 (1994). The ABA's Standing Committee on Federal
Judiciary has the power to promote or oppose nominations and confirmations of persons for
appointments as judges of United States courts. Id.
28 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 443 (stating that "[s]ince 1952 the President, through
the Department of Justice, has requested advice from the American Bar Association's
Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary [I in making [federal judicial] nominations");
HAROLD W. CHASE, FEDERAL JUDGES: THE APPOINTING PROCESS 120-22 (1972) (explaining
origin of Standing Committee's role in evaluating candidates for judiciary); GRos mAN,
supra note 13, at 64 (stating that Standing Committee's working relationship with Senate
Judiciary Committee, between 1946 and 1952, facilitated its attaining involvement in eval-
uating candidates for Supreme Court).
29 See Roberta Cooper Ramo, Editorial, Criticism of ABA Misses the Mark, BALT. SUN,
June 5, 1996, at A16 (stating that twenty-six potential nominees, three Republicans and
twenty-three Democrats, were nominated before Senate, even though ABA Standing Com-
mittee found them to be "Not Qualified").
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is the only entity in the judicial selection process focused solely on
professional qualifications.3 °
A bipartisan study of judicial selection recently released by the
University of Virginia's White Burkett Miller Center of Public Af-
fairs found that "[a]lthough the role of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary has been criti-
cized, alternatively by liberals and conservatives, the Committee
does serve a useful function in evaluating the professional qualifi-
cations of judicial nominees."31
It should also be noted that, despite differences on specific nomi-
nations, members of the Senate Judiciary Committee have recog-
nized that the ABA Committee provides critical information to the
judicial selection process. This bipartisan support was demon-
strated in a recent exchange between then-Chairman Biden, and
current Chairman Hatch during the confirmation hearing of Jus-
tice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.32
30 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 1 (explaining how Committee "restricts its review to
issues bearing on professional qualifications").
31 THE MILLER CENTER OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, IMPROVING THE PROCESS OF APPOINTING FED-
ERAL JUDGES: A REPORT OF THE MILLER CENTER COMMISSION ON THE SELECTION OF FEDERAL
JUDGES 5 (1996) [hereinafter MILLER CENTER REPORT]. See ABA Role in Judicial Selection:
Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, (May 21, 1996) (statement of Daniel J.
Meador) [hereinafter Meador Statement], available in 1996 WL 10164366 (stating that
Miller Center implicitly endorsed ABA's role in evaluating judicial nominees); see also Mar-
cia Cole, Panel Issues Report on Judicial Selection Gridlock, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1996, at
A10 (offering summary of Miller Center's findings and concluding that biggest problem in
selection process is amount of time taken to fill vacancies).
32 Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 377-78
(1993) (statements of Senator Hatch and Senator Biden).
The CHAIRMAN. I have no further questions. I only want to thank you again because
I think people vastly underrate the incredible amount of work that you all undertake.
We in this committee know because our staffs read every one of the opinions. We know
what it is like.
You are in active practice at the time while you are doing it. We appreciate it, and I
would like to publicly extend my thanks to you, both of you, and to the Bar Association
generally for being willing to perform this function.
I yield now to my friend from Utah.
Senator HATCH. I want to join in that praise because I think the changes that have
been made at the ABA and the renewed look at the committee and the restructuring of
the committee have been very excellent. And I know that it takes a lot of time. It is a
lot of effort. You folks are doing a tremendous job for the benefit of the legal community
at large, but really for the public at large. And the committee has approached this in
an apolitical way, as it should, and I just want to personally acknowledge that in front
of everybody here today.
So thank you for the efforts you have put forth, the testimony you have given, and
the work that you all have done.
1996]
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It is well-known that the Committee provides an advisory and
absolutely vital service to the government. While the ABA Com-
mittee's role is not dictated by the Constitution3 3 and the Presi-
dent and the Senate are not obligated to consult with the Commit-
tee, the Committee is asked to conduct evaluations, as a direct
result of the high value provided by its evaluations.3 4
It is apparent from the questions currently being raised about
the Committee and its ability to render impartial evaluations of
the professional qualifications of federal judicial nominees, that
perhaps the Committee's practices and procedures are not fully
understood. In order to clarify any misunderstandings in this re-
gard, it may be helpful to detail the Committee's evaluation pro-
cess and criteria.
II. EvALUATION CRITERIA
The Committee's evaluation of prospective federal judicial nomi-
nees is directed [solely] to professional qualifications - integrity,
professional competence, and judicial temperament.
Integrity is self-defining: The prospective nominee's character
and general reputation in the legal community are investigated,
as are his or her industry and diligence.
Professional competence encompasses such qualities as intellec-
tual capacity, judgment, writing and analytical ability, knowledge
of the law and breadth of professional experience.
The Committee believes that ordinarily a prospective nominee
to the federal bench should be admitted to the bar for at least
twelve years.3 5
The twelve year guideline is not an automatic disqualification
and may be offset by compensating experience and accomplish-
ments in the field of law. Substantial courtroom experience, or
33 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The President:
shall have power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties
... ; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme
court, and all other Officers of the United States ....
Id.
34 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 147 (acknowledging fact that "[tihe ABA's
participation is strictly a matter of Executive Branch custom and is not directed by law");
Linda Greenhouse, Court Vacancy Renews Debate on A.B.A. Role, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27,
1987, at A24 (stating that Committee's role in judicial selection is "defined by custom
rather than law"); see also Ross, supra note 22, at 37 (stating that "Presidents have ac-
corded different levels of deference" to Standing Committee's evaluations).
35 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 3.
[Vol. 12:93
ABA'S INTEGRAL ROLE
experience of a similar nature such as appearing before, or serving
on administrative agencies or arbitration boards, or teaching trial
advocacy or other clinical law school courses, is an important qual-
ification for prospective nominees to both the appellate and the
trial courts. 6 The Committee further believes that appellate court
nominees should possess an especially high degree of scholarship
and talent. The Committee, when investigating judicial tempera-
ment, considers the prospective nominee's "compassion, decisive-
ness, open-mindedness, sensitivity, courtesy, patience, freedom
from bias, and commitment to equal justice."37
The Committee rates prospective nominees on the following
scale:38
"Well Qualified": To merit this rating, "the prospective nominee
must be at the top of the legal profession in his or her legal com-
munity, have outstanding legal ability, wide experience, the high-
est reputation for integrity and either have shown, or have exhib-
ited the capacity for, judicial temperament, and have the
Committee's strongest affirmative endorsement." 39
"Qualified": This evaluation "means that the prospective nomi-
nee meets the Committee's very high standards with respect to
integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament and
that the Committee believes that the prospective nominee will be
able to perform satisfactorily all of the responsibilities required by
the high office of a federal judge."4"
"Not Qualified": A prospective nominee is found Not Qualified
when "the Committee's investigation has indicated that the pro-
spective nominee does not meet the Committee's standards with
regard to integrity, professional competence, or judicial
temperament."41
36 See id. at 3 (stating that experience is important quality for potential nominees).
37 Id. at 4.
38 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 444 n.2 (1989) (ex-
plaining that ratings used for Supreme Court nominee evaluations were "Well qualified,'
'not opposed,' and 'not qualified'"); Washington Legal Fund. v. United States Dep't of Jus-
tice, 691 F. Supp. 483, 487 (D.D.C. 1988), affd sub nom., Public Citizen v. United States
Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440 (1989) (stating that system used in 1988 for lower court
judges was that of "'exceptionally well qualified,' 'well qualified,' 'qualified,' or 'not
qualified'").
39 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 7.
40 Id.
41 Id.
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III. APPOINTMENTS TO THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS,
DISTRICT COURTS AND THE COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE
To commence the Committee's evaluation of the professional
qualifications of persons considered for appointment to the Courts
of Appeals, District Courts, and the Court of International
Trade, 2 the Office of the Attorney General confidentially forwards
to the Committee the name of a prospective nominee under con-
sideration for a seat on one of these courts.43 The Committee
neither proposes candidates for the federal judiciary, nor does it
lobby for any nomination. 4 Representatives of the Committee
have always testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on
any circuit or district court nominee who receives a Not Qualified
rating.
The Committee's investigation, which is conducted pre-nomina-
tion, is ordinarily assigned to the member of the Committee resid-
ing in the judicial circuit (the "circuit member") in which the judi-
cial vacancy exists, unless that member is overburdened or a
conflict exists. A second member of the Committee is asked to par-
ticipate in an investigation when a candidate's career has ex-
tended geographically over more than one circuit, or to conduct an
independent investigation, if it appears from the initial investiga-
tion that the candidate may receive a Not Qualified rating.
Receipt of the completed Personal Data Questionnaire (PDQ) is
the starting point of the Committee's investigation. The PDQ pro-
vides substantial information regarding a candidate's professional
background and experience, and it also includes writing sam-
42 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 444. "Prior to announcing the names of nominees for
judgeships on the courts of appeals, the district courts, or the Court of International Trade,
the President, acting through the Department of Justice, routinely requests a potential
nominee to complete a questionnaire drawn up by the ABA Committee...." Id.
43 Id. at 444 (explaining that "potential nominee's answers and the referral of his or her
name to the ABA Committee are kept confidential"); GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 46 (stat-
ing that Attorney General's office agrees to allow Standing Committee to investigate by
supplying Committee with names of prospective nominees); WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 1
(stating that Attorney General refers names to Committee, then Committee begins its
evaluation).
44 See Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 444 (stating that ABA Committee never evaluates po-
tential judicial nominees on its own initiative); see also GROSSMAN, supra note 13, at 46-47
(stating that Standing Committee has opportunity to oppose nominations in Senate if Pres-
ident nominates "unqualified" candidate); WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 1 (stating that
"Committee never proposes candidates for the federal judiciary, believing that to do so
might compromise its evaluative function").
[Vol. 12:93
ABA'S INTEGRAL ROLE
ples.45 The circuit member then examines the available legal writ-
ings and personally conducts extensive confidential interviews
with those likely to have information regarding the integrity, pro-
fessional competence, and judicial temperament of the prospective
nominee. Persons contacted by the circuit member include federal
and state judges, practicing lawyers in both private and govern-
ment service, law school professors and deans, legal services and
public interest lawyers, and representatives of professional legal
organizations, such as state and local bar associations. A typical
investigation takes about thirty days to complete.46 In cases
where questions are raised as to the candidate's qualifications, the
circuit member will take whatever time is necessary to arrive at a
fair, accurate and complete evaluation. The circuit member meets
with the candidate to review his or her qualifications for a judge-
ship and also raises any adverse information discovered during
the investigation. The information is discussed and the candidate
is afforded the opportunity to provide any additional materials
bearing on the information.
At the conclusion of the initial information-gathering, the cir-
cuit member prepares a written informal report containing a de-
scription of the prospective nominee's background, summaries of
all interviews conducted, including the interview(s) with the pro-
spective nominee, an evaluation of the prospective nominee's pro-
fessional qualifications, and a recommended rating. After receiv-
ing the informal report and discussing it with the circuit member,
the Chairperson discusses it with the Attorney General's office
and indicates the tentative evaluation. If the office of the Attorney
General so requests, the circuit member prepares a formal or final
report which is sent to all members of the Committee, together
with the response to the PDQ and copies of any other relevant
material.4 7 The Committee members then inform the Chairperson
of their individual votes, and if questions are raised, the Commit-
45 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 148 (explaining Personal Data Question-
naire process); see also MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 31, at 15-28 (providing abstract
of Standing Committee's questionnaire).
46 See Meador Statement, supra note 31 (stating that Committee attempts to comply
with self-imposed thirty day timetable); see also MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 31, at
8 (suggesting that Committee expand in size so that it will be able to complete its investiga-
tions within thirty days).
47 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 148 (explaining process by which Attorney
General receives ratings); Davis, supra note 2, at 552 (explaining process by which Attor-
ney General receives ratings).
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tee discusses the prospective nominee either over a telephone con-
ference call or at a meeting.48
Once the Committee reaches a decision, the Chairperson confi-
dentially advises the office of the Attorney General of the rating,
indicating whether the vote was unanimous - if not unanimous,
then the Chairperson relays the rating of both the majority and
the minority.49 If the President nominates the prospective nomi-
nee, the Senate Judiciary Committee holds public hearings where,
upon request, the ABA rating will be released to both the candi-
date and the public. Copies of the report itself, which contains
information gathered from confidential interviews, are never pro-
vided to anyone outside the Committee, including the President,
the Attorney General, and the Senate Judiciary Committee, or
anyone within the ABA.50
IV. APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT
The Committee's investigation of candidates for the United
States Supreme Court is also directed solely to professional quali-
fications: Integrity, professional competence, and temperament.
While the same factors considered with respect to the lower fed-
eral courts are relevant to an appointment to the Supreme Court,
the Committee's investigation is based on the premise that the
Supreme Court requires a person with exceptional professional
qualifications. 51
There are several procedural differences between the Commit-
tee's investigations of Supreme Court candidates and candidates
for other Article III courts that have evolved since the Committee
began evaluating candidates for the federal judiciary. First, Pres-
idents now will publicly announce their intention to nominate a
particular candidate before referring the name to the ABA Com-
mittee. Second, all members of the Committee conduct inter-
views, within their own geographic areas, of those persons likely
48 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 6 (explaining communications that occur within
Committee).
49 See id. at 6-7 (providing summary of confidentiality of ratings).
50 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 148 (describing process by which rating is
released and fact that report remains in confidence); see also WHAT IT IS, supra note 20, at 7
(explaining process by which ratings may become public, while report does not); Davis,
supra note 2, at 553 (stating that Committee strictly adheres to its policy on
confidentiality).
51 See WHAT IT IS, supra note 20, at 8 (providing evaluation criteria and investigation
procedures for potential candidates to Supreme Court).
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to have information regarding the professional qualifications of
the candidate. Typically, hundreds of such interviews are con-
ducted. 52 Third, teams of law school professors examine the legal
writings (i.e. opinions, briefs, and articles) of the candidate.53 Fi-
nally, a team of practicing lawyers, which may include former
Supreme Court law clerks, examines the legal writings of a candi-
date, as a valuable cross-check on the academic evaluation. These
independent outside reviews, like the investigation as a whole, are
intended to weigh professional competence and not to assess the
ideology of the candidate. The results of these analyses are re-
ported to the full Committee for discussion and evaluation.54
The Committee utilizes the same rating categories when evalu-
ating prospective nominees to the United States Supreme Court
as it utilizes when evaluating potential nominees for the other fed-
eral courts. To merit the Committee's evaluation of Qualified or
Well Qualified, however, the
. . . nominee must be at the top of the legal profession, have
outstanding legal ability and wide [legall experience and meet
the highest standards of integrity, professional competence,
and judicial temperament. The evaluation of Well Qualified is
reserved for those found to merit the Committee's strongest
affirmative endorsement.
The third category consists of those who are found Not
Qualified for appointment to the United States Supreme
Court with respect to integrity, professional competence or ju-
dicial temperament. 55
The Committee's rating of a Supreme Court candidate is confi-
dentially reported to the Attorney General and, following the nom-
ination, reported to the Senate Judiciary Committee.56 At the Sen-
52 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 148 (stating that almost anyone in "position
to evaluate the candidate's competence, integrity and temperament" is interviewed); see
also Davis, supra note 2, at 552 (stating that anyone who can evaluate judicial competence
of potential nominee is interviewed).
53 See WHAT IT Is, supra note 20, at 9 (explaining process by which candidates works are
investigated).
54 See id. at 9 (explaining that this process is actually rather lengthy and may lead, in
some instances, to another investigation).
55 Id. at 9.
56 See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 445 (1989) (stating
that after formal nomination, committee chair gives informal, confidential report to Attor-
ney General, and when potential nominee is nominated, ABA Committee's rating, but not
entire report, is revealed to Senate Judiciary Committee); see also WHAT IT IS, supra note
20, at 9 (explaining process by which ratings are communicated).
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ate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings, a spokesperson
for the Committee appears and reports on the reasons for the
Committee's evaluation of the nominee.
The Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary is committed to
ensuring that its evaluations of the professional qualifications of
candidates are thorough and impartial. To this end, the Commit-
tee constantly seeks to refine and improve its standards and pro-
cedures and believes that opportunities to discuss the important
work of the Committee and any concerns about its processes are
always valuable.
Unlike the Senate Judiciary Committee, which is made up en-
tirely of members of the U.S. Senate and reports directly to the
U.S. Senate, the Federal Judiciary Committee of the ABA is not
made up of members of the ABA House of Delegates and does not
report to the ABA House of Delegates.5 7 The Standing Committee
is the final word on its evaluations. Neither the ABA Board of
Governors, the House of Delegates, nor the officers of the Associa-
tion play any role whatsoever in the judgments rendered by the
Standing Committee.
As difficult as it may be to understand to those who have not
participated in the Standing Committee's work, there is truly a
wall of separation between the policies and the politics of the ABA
and the workings of the Standing Committee. In addition, the
Committee's own governing principles protect the Committee's in-
dependence and ensure its position as a neutral evaluator.
CONCLUSION
For more than 50 years, the ABA Standing Committee has pro-
vided, to Republican and Democratic administrations alike, the
only objective and non-political evaluation of the professional
qualifications of candidates.58 The reputations of the Committee
members and their pledge of confidentiality cause their peers to
share comments with them that would otherwise never see the
light of day. Clearly, the Committee's evaluation is but one factor
57 See ABA CONST. art. 31, § 31.7 (1994) (stating that Standing Committee may act on
behalf of ABA, requiring no additional procedures).
58 See CHASE, supra note 18, at 20 (claiming that beginning in 1945 it became "custom-
ary" for Standing Committee to report on qualifications of federal judicial nominees); Ross,
supra note 22, at 62 (stating that ever since its inception in 1946, Standing Committee has
been consulted in federal judicial selection).
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the President considers in appointing judges and that the Senate
considers in confirmation.5 9 It is beyond question, however, that
the Committee's evaluations have brought to the judicial selection
process essential information about the professional qualifications
of judicial candidates.6 °
In its recent report, the Miller Center made a number of recom-
mendations aimed at lessening the role of politics in and stream-
lining the increasingly prolonged process of appointing federal
judges. The Commission included prominent members of both the
Republican and the Democratic Administrations and members of
Congress, including Attorney General Nicholas deBelleville Kat-
zenbach, 6 ' former Deputy Attorney General Harold R. Tyler, Jr.,62
former United States Senators Howard Baker63 and Birch Bayh,64
former White House Counsel Fred Fielding6 5 and Lloyd N. Cut-
ler,66 and former judges A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.,67 Frederick B.
59 See Judicial Vacancies, supra note 19, at 145-46 (stating that FBI and Department of
Justice investigations are reviewed, as well as questionnaires and financial disclosures);
see also Laurence H. Silberman, The American Bar Association and Judicial Nominations,
59 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1092, 1098 (1991) (stating that President's desire approval by
Standing Committee as indication that entire ABA is in support of candidates).
60 See MILLER CENTER REPORT, supra note 31, at 5 (stating that Committee's evaluations
of potential nominees' professional qualifications is useful); see also Marcia Cole, Panel Is-
sues Report on Judicial Selection Gridlock, NAT'L L.J., May 27, 1996, at A10 (quoting for-
mer Attorney General Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach as stating, "[ilf we didn't have the
ABA to do what Attorney General Herbert Brownell first asked it to do, we would have to
find some other guarantor of professional competence").
61 Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach was an Assistant Attorney General and a Deputy
Attorney General from 1961 through 1965 and was the Under Secretary of State and the
Attorney General during the Lyndon B. Johnson Administration.
62 Harold R. Tyler, Jr. was the United States Attorney General from 1959 through 1960
and a district judge in the Southern District of New York from 1962 through 1975. He then
became Deputy Attorney General under President Gerald R. Ford. Tyler was also, at one
time, the chairman of the ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary.
63 Howard H. Baker, Jr. served Tennessee as a member of the United States Senate
from 1967 through 1985, and he was the Senate Majority Leader from 1981 through 1985.
Mr. Baker also served as the Chief of Staff for President Reagan during 1987 and 1988.
64 Birch Bayh served three terms as a United States Senator from Indiana. He was also
the Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on the Constitution, the
position from where he became the principal congressional author of the Twenty-fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
65 Fred Fisher Fielding was Counsel to President Ronald Reagan, from 1981 through
1986. He was also Deputy Counsel to the President from 1972 through 1974 and was Assis-
tant Counsel from 1970 until he was promoted to Deputy Counsel.
66 Lloyd N. Cutler was Counsel to the President during President James Carter's last
two years in office, and he also served as Special Counsel to President William J. Clinton
for six months in 1994.
67 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. is Chief Judge Emeritus of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit, where he was a judge from 1977 through 1993. Prior to being
a circuit judge, he was a judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania for fourteen years.
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Lacey,68 and Kimba Wood. 69 The bipartisan study concluded that
the ABA committee has played and should continue to play an im-
portant role in the judicial selection process.
68 Frederick B. Lacey was a United States District Judge for the District of New Jersey
from 1971 through 1986.
69 Kimba M. Wood is a United States District Judge for the Southern District of New
York. She was a member of the ABA House of Delegates in 1984.
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